Note by Editors,
April, r943
NOTE
Rent Control and the Pennsylvania Eviction Laws
A plan for the regulation of evictions is essential to every effective rent
control program.' Accordingly, it was provided in the rent control pro-
visions of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 that the Administrator
might "regulate or prohibit . . . speculative or manipulative practices or
renting or leasing practices (including practices relating to recovery of the
possession) . . . which in his judgment are equivalent to or are likely
to result in price or rent increases . . ." 2 The program of eviction con-
trol created by regulations issued under this broad power provides for the
intervention by the 0. P. A. in eviction proceedings brought in the state
courts.2 Thus, control of evictions is made to depend in the first.instance
upon the willingness of state judges to cooperate with the federal regulatory
agencies in suspending normal remedies of the landlord, and in the second
instance upon resort to injunctive and criminal proceedings in the federal
courts against recalcitrant lessors. The writers of this note contemplate an
analysis of the problems arising from the operation of 0. P. A. rent control
in Pennsylvania. Such an analysis requires a preliminary examination of
the common law and statutory methods of eviction in this Commonwealth.
Proceedings to Recover Possession in Pennsylvania
One feature of Pennsylvania landlord and tenant law that is imme-
diately apparent to one who makes merely a casual study of it is the nu-
merous provisions by which a landlord may speedily eject his tenant. These
repossessory remedies early appeared, being noted in both statutory enact-
ments and common law interpretations.' They have been preserved by the
courts of this state which have maintained a sympathetic attitude toward
the rights of property-owners; and this attitude has not been demonstrated
alone in the application of repossessory remedies.5 The landlord's rem-
edies can be classified according to the tribunal in which action is instituted.
Generally, the -common law proceedings are prosecuted in the courts of
record, while the statutory actions are brought before magistrates, justices
of the peace, and aldermen.
I. Borders, Emergency Rent Control (1942) 9 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 107,
119. See also Winnet, Rent Control-The Philadelphia Experiment (x942) 14 PA.
BAR Ass'N. Q. 71. In evaluating the experience of Philadelphia with its voluntary
rent control program, Judge Winnet says: "A voice of authority was needed, either to
stay a clear legal right to possession or to direct a desperate tenant to remain in unsatis-
factory quarters until the occupant of his new and better quarters could find some other
place for himself. . . . And yes, authority was needed if the situation got more
desperate even to stop sales of property by denying possession as long as the occupant
could find no other place." Id. at 74.
2. Pub. L. No. 42I, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan. 30, 1942) § 2 (d). (Italics sup-
plied.)
3. Maximum Rent Regulation No. 28, June 30, 1942, § 1388.18o6, 7 FED. RE. 49,5
(July I, 1942) ; Maximum Rent Regulation No. 60, Dec. II, 1942, § 1388.786, 7 FED.
REG. 10451 (Dec. 15, 1942). The provision for intervention in eviction proceedings
may be inferred from § 6 (d), providing for notice thereof to the Area Rent Office of
the 0. P. A. within 24 hours after notice to the tenant.
4. See BINKS'S JusTcE (I2th ed. 1928) 666-667.
5. E. g., Pile v. Pedrick, r67 Pa. 296, 31 Atl. 646 (1895) (encroaching buildings);
Thompson v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co., 218 Pa. 444, 67 Atl. 768 (19o7) (trespassing
children), overruled by Thompson et al. v. Reading Co., 243 Pa. 585, 23 A. (2d) 729(6942).
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Proceedings in Courts of Record
The oldest procedure by which a landlord can regain possession from
his tenant is the common law action of ejectment.6  This.remedy may be
brought only at the end of the term,7 or upon a showing that for some
reason the tenant has forfeited his lease and the landlord is thereby entitled
to immediate possession.8 Because of the slow and cumbersome nature of
the action, the expenses incident to a jury trial, and the opportunity for a
"troublesome tenant" to "harass his landlord", common law ejectment has
become obsolete as a device to effect dispossession.9
Despite the fact that few adverse actions of ejectment are litigated be-
tween landlords and their tenants, leases in this state are commonly drawn
with a broad power of attorney enabling the landlord to obtain a judgment
in an amicable action of ejectment.10 As early as 1822, Chief Justice Tilgh-
man said in upholding a judgment by confession entered in an amicable
action, "I make no doubt, that thousands of judgments have been entered
in this way; and they must not now be questioned.""1 This policy to
uphold judgments obtained by confession has been retained by the Penn-
sylvania courts.12 How firmly the procedure has become imbedded in the
law of this state is illustrated by the following language of Justice Paxon
in Reams v. Pancoast: 's
"It would have been better if the learned judge of the court below
had omitted from his charge the expression of his personal dislike to
the lease [which contained a warrant authorizing confession of judg-
ment in ejectment] . . . It was not material to the issue upon trial.
Moreover, it was well calculated to prejudice the case of the defendant.
The average juryman would not be likely to regard a lease of this
nature with much favor, and when the court adds the weight of its
condemnation, there is danger of the real merits of the case being lost
sight of."
A statute of I8o61 4 prescribed a procedure by which judgments could
be entered by confession. A similar statute was passed in I836,15 and
numerous other acts have since been passed to perfect the procedure.' 6
However, none of these statutes has been applied to the exclusion of the
6. BINNS'S JUSTICE (12th ed. 1928) 667.
7. Stofflit v. Troxell, 8 W. & S. 340 (Pa. 1845) ; accord, Evans v. Hastings, 9 Pa.
273 (1848).
8. Penn v. Divellin, 2 Yeates 309 (Pa. 1798) ; see Kline v. Johnston, 24 Pa. 72, 75
(1854).
9. BIxNs's JUSTICE (12th ed. 1928) 667. The remedy still seems valuable in cases
where, because there is no definite landlord-tenant relationship, there might be diffi-
culty in obtaining an eviction by some other disposessory remedy. Steininger v. Spaid
et al., 300 Pa. 428, 15o At. 62o (1930).
IO. For illustrations of the form of such leases see KLEIN, JUDGMENT BY CONFES-
SION IN PENNSYLVANIA (1929) 2o6-209.
ii. Cook ct al. v. Gilbert, 8 S. & R. 567, 568 (1822).
12. The subject of amicable actions in ejectment receives its most recent exhaustive
treatment in the cases from Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corp. v. Potts, 92 Pa. Super. I
(1927) to Youghiogheny-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Carlet, 92 Pa. Super. 40 (1927). The
subject is given textbook treatment in KLEIN, JUDGMENT BY CONFESSION IN PENNSYL-
VANIA (1929) 206-234.
13. 1II Pa. 42, 47, 2 Atl. 205, 206 (i885).
14. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, I93) tit. 12, § 738.
i5. Act of June i3, 1836, P. L. 568.
16. The various acts are collected and indexed in KLEIN, JUDGMENT BY CONFES-
SION IN PENNSYLVANIA (1929) 297.
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common law; 17 and, if the amicable action is instituted in conformity with
the practice existing prior to the passage of the acts, the judgment obtained
is valid despite variance from the statutory procedure.' 8 In this connec-
tion, it must be noted that the process of obtaining a judgment by confes-
sion in an amicable action of ejectment is subject to the general limitations
applicable to all judgments by confession; e. g., that, although the terms of
the power of attorney may be as broad as the parties desire,19 upon exer-
cise of the warrant the power will be strictly construed; 20 that once exer-
cised the power is exhausted and cannot support a second judgment.2
Ejected tenants have occasionally made attefnpts to attack the validity
of judgments by confession entered against them. Almost without excep-
tion these attacks have failed. So long as the judgment is regular on its
face, the courts will refuse to strike it off.22 Frequently all right to appeal
has been expressly waived in the lease, and such waiver will be enforced
regardless of the hardship on the tenant,'23 who probably was unaware of
its full meaning when he signed the agreement. Moreover, the judgment
may not be attacked collaterally. Since it is regarded as a conclusive
determination between the parties,'24 the judgment may be pleaded in bar
to an action of trespass brought against the landlord by his dispossessed
tenant.2  However, if a showing of fraud, mistake, or some other meri-
torious defense can be made, the courts will honor the appropriate motion
and will open the judgment ; 26 but this equitable remedy is not available in
the vast majority of cases.
Proceedings in the Magistrates' Courts
"The legislature have carefully avoided giving to magistrates any
jurisdiction upon question of title to lands, and have confined their author-
ity to cases requiring prompt remedy, leaving the right of trial by jury
to the judicial tribunals, in all cases involving the right of ownership. To
have subjected a landlord to the delay of ordinary trials in a court of law,
in the cases provided for before justices of the peace, would have been
to jeopard the collection of rent in arrear, and deprive landlords of their
right of possession, without any adequate security for redress of such
wrongs. The jurisdiction of magistrates extends only to restore or change
possession of real estate; and the various acts of assembly prescribe the
17. McCalmot v. Peters, 13 S. & R. 196 (1825) ; Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corp.
v. Potts, 92 Pa. Super. I (1927) ; Mould v. Shade, 2 Berks 327 (Pa. 19o6).
I8. Peerless Soda Fountain Service Co. v. Lipschutz, ioi Pa. Super. 568 (931);
Iillman Coal & Coke Co. v. Metcalfe, 92 Pa. Super. 14 (2927); Vesta Coal Co. v.
Jones, 92 Pa. Super. 30 (2927).
29. For a good example of a broad warrant see the one before the court in Con-
sumer's Min. Co. v. Chabak, 92 Pa. Super. 17 (1927). In that case the lessee's waiver
of all right to appeal was held binding upon him, regardless of the nature of defect or
error in the proceeding.
2o. Deibert v. Rhodes, 291 Pa. 550, 14o Atl. 515 (1928) ; Jordan v. Kirschner, 94
Pa. Super. 252 (1928) ; Disanto v. Rowland, 83 Pa. Super. 155 (1924).
* 21. Philadelphia v. Johnson, 2o8 Pa. 645, 57 Atl. III4. But cf. Morris v. Beis-
wanger, 22 Del. 34 (Pa. 1931).
22. Dikeman v. Butterfield, 135 Pa. 236, 19 Atl. 938 (i8go) ; Rochester & Pitts-
burgh C. & I. Co. v. Maydock, 7 Pa. D. & C. 322 (1925).
23. Consumer's Min. Co. v. Chabak, 92 Pa. Super. 17 (1927).
24. Usmik et al. v. Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corp., 305 Pa. 355, 157 Atl. 787
(931).
25. Dickson v. Wood, 209 Pa. 345, 58 Ati. 668 (904).
26. Mutual Building & Loan Ass'n v. Walukiewicz, 322 Pa. 240, 85 Atl. 648
(1936) ; Dikeman v. Butterfield, 135 Pa. 236, 19 Atl. 938 (289o).
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circumstances and the manner under which this jurisdiction shall be exer-
cised." 2
(i) Recovery of possession at expiration of term
In the year 1772 a statute was enacted permitting a landlord to bring
proceedings before a magistrate to recover possession at the expiration of
his tenant's term.28 Nearly a century later, in 1863, a second statute estab-
lished a somewhat different procedure for obtaining similar relief.29 Both
of these statutes are still in force in Pennsylvania. Inasmuch as they exist
as concurrent remedies,O it is important to examine the provisions of each.
Under the act of 1772 the landlord is required, three months prior to
the time the premises are to be vacated, to serve his tenant with a notice
to quit possession.8 ' The three months having passed and the tenant hav-
ing persisted in his refusal to vacate, the landlord may go before the
appropriate magistrates; 32 there, upon proof of the lease,8 8 its termination,
and three months' notice given, he obtains a warrant in the nature of a
summons commanding the sheriff 8, to summon twelve "substantial free-
holders" 35 and the lessee to appear within four days, at which time the
lessee may make his defense. If upon this hearing before the magistrate
and the twelve freeholders the landlord makes out a case,8 6 or the lessee
fails to appear, judgment is given for possession and damages,87 and a writ
of possession is issued.
The fundamental provisions of the act of 1863 closely parallel those of
the act of 1772. However, certain significant differences should be noted.
First, under the later act notice must be given three months prior to the
expiration of the term,88 while under the act of 1772 it may be given after
the term has expired, so long as the tenant is given three months to vacate.
Secondly, under this act only one magistrate is required to hear the case,
whereas under the older act two were required in all places other than
Philadelphia. Finally, the act of of 1863 has dispensed with the require-
ment that twelve freeholders be summoned to determine the facts of the case.
The provisions of the act of 1863 have been extended to cases involving
leases for less than one year by an act of 19o5 . 9 The only significant dif-
ference between this act and that of 1863 is that the required notice need
be given only thirty days before proceedings may be instituted.
40
(2) Recovery of possession for non-payment of rent
Not only do landlords need a procedure to evict tenants who hold out
at the end of their terms, but they also need a means of dispossessing ten-
27. BINNs's JusncE (I2th ed. 1928) 666-67.
28. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, i931) tit. 68, § 361.29. Id., § 364.
30. Gavit v. Hall, 75 Pa. 363 (1874) ; Rich v. Keyser, 54 Pa. 86 (867).
31. The notice need not be a written one. Wilgus v. Whitehead, 89 Pa. 131 (1879).
32. ". . . any two justices of the city, town or country where the demised prem-
ises are situate. . ."
33. Leases for a year, less than a year, or from month to month are within the act.
Shaffer v. Sutton, 5 Binn. 228 (Pa. 1812) ; Spidle v. Hess, 13 Pa. Dist. 449 (19o3).
34. Ayres v. Novinger, 8 Pa. 412 (1848).
35. Rhoads v. Wesner, i Woodw. 79 (Pa. 1863).
36. DeCoursey v. Guarantee Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 81 Pa. 217 (1876).
37. Damages are awarded only for unjust detention. Watts v. Fox, 64 Pa. 336
(1870).
38. Rich v. Keyser, 54 Pa. 86 (1867).
39. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193r) tit. 68, § 366.
40. Robinson v. Kuhen, 83 Pa. Super. 337 (1924).
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ants who default in rent payments. 4 1  Consequently, statutes have been
enacted to fill this need, and a summary procedure before a magistrate has
been afforded the landlord. Under the act of J830,42 as amended by the
act of I861, 4 3 when the lessee fails to pay the rent as contracted for and
the tenant's personal property on the premises is insufficient to pay the
arrearages, the lessor begins dispossessory action by serving a notice on the
lessee to quit the premises. 4 If the lessee fails to comply with this notice,
the landlord, upon proof of rent due and owing, may have the local mag-
istrate issue an order to the sheriff to summon the lessee to appear for a
hearing. If the landlord fails in his burden of proof on the hearing, 5 he
must bear the costs thereof; if he obtains judgment in his favor, a writ of
possession will be granted five days thereafter. However, the tenant may
avoid dispossession by paying his arrearages at any time before the writ
is executed.
(3) Other applicable statutes
Complementing the above-mentioned dispossessory statutes is a group
of miscellaneous enactments. An act of 1905 46 establishes the procedure
for executing the writ of possession. Where the tenant retains the prem-
ises against the constable serving the writ, the latter may return it "un-
served because the occupant forcibly detained possession of the premises."
Whereupon, ten days after judgment has been entered, the constable gives
notice to the tenant that an alias writ, authorizing the use of force, will be
issued. If the tenant persists in his refusal to vacate for ten days after
receiving the notice, the alias writ is issued and such force as necessary
is used to eject the tenant.
4 7
An act of 1913 provides a means of serving an absent tenant. 48 Other
statutes establish form of proof of a lost lease,4 9 and a procedure for dis-
possession where the tenant has failed to perform certain required serv-
ices," or where he has removed from the premises without leaving suffi-
cient property to secure three months' rent.5 Some of these acts are
expressly limited to particular localities; and some of them will require
discussion for our present purpose.
(4) Review of proceedings before magistrates
Difficulty of obtaining a review of the summary eviction proceedings
outlined above is another illustration of the way the Pennsylvania law
has, as a practical matter, operated beneficially for the landlord. There
are two general methods by which a tenant may secure a review of an
41. See page 652 supra.
42. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 68, §§ 391, 392.
43. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193) tit. 68, §393.
44. To save the tenant inconvenience the time of notice is varied according to the
season of the year. Between April Ist and September ist a fifteen days' notice will
suffice; between September Ist and April Ist, the notice must be given thirty days be-
fore the tenant is asked to vacate.
45. He must establish *nter alia a lease with a certain rent reserved, said rent in
arrears, insufficiency of chattels of tenant on the premises to pay the rent, and the ten-
ant's refusal to surrender the premises.
46. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 68, § 368.
47. Use of excessive force subjects the constable to an action for damages. Warcho
v. Rogers, 7o Pitts. L. J. 671 (Pa. 1922).
48. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193i) tit. 68, § 370.
49. Id., § 374.
50. Id., § 395.
5. Id., §396.
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adverse judgment given by a magistrate: (i) certiorari to the court of
Common Pleas or the Supreme Court; (2) appeal to the court of Com-
mon Pleas.
The act of 1772 prescribes no method for reviewing the determina-
tion of the magistrates and the twelve freeholders. Nevertheless, it has
been held that a party may obtain a review of the proceedings by writ of
certiorari under the common law. 52 Moreover, both the act of I830 and
that of 1863 expressly preserve the writ with its usual form and effect.53
The writ of certiorari is never granted as a matter of right, but is
given in the discretion of the court to which application has been made.54
Except in Philadelphia County, where application for the writ must be
made within ten days of the magistrate's judgment, 5 there is uncertainty
as to the time within which an application will be considered.56 It has
been held that an application made twenty days after judgment is season-
able; 57 on the other hand, a delay of one hundred and two days has been
held to be too great.' s The scope of review on certiorari is extremely
limited. The regularity of the proceedings alone can be examined.59
Though no inquiry may be made into the facts found by the justice nor
any new evidence accepted relative thereto, 60 depositions may be intro-
duced to show fraud, oppression, or want of jurisdiction."'
Thus it can be seen that the writ of certiorari is not a particularly
valuable method of review for the evicted tenant. 62  Moreover, the fact
that it is not a supersedes, except in Philadelphia County,6' 3 makes it an
even less effective weapon. The tenant may find himself in the street long
before he obtains a ruling on the proceedings. Finally, in Philadelphia
County, where certiorari will stay execution of the writ of possession, to
obtain that benefit the tenant must post bond for "all costs that have accrued
or may accrue, and of the rent which has already or may become due, up
to the time of final determination of said certiorari." 64
Whereas the act of 1772 contains no express provision for a review
of the proceedings before the magistrates and the freeholders, 65 both the
act of 183o and that of 1863, in addition to preserving the writ of certiorari,
provide for an appeal to the court of Common Pleas. This appeal is to
be tried "in the same manner that other suits are tried." The appeal pro-
visions of the act of 1863 have been extended to the act of 19o5 by judi-
cial decision.66
If the eviction proceedings are instituted for non-payment of rent, the
appeal must be taken within five days from the entry of judgment; 67 if
52. Lenox v. McCall, 3 S. & R. 95 (1817).
53. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 68, §§ 392, 364.
54. McGinnis v. Vernon, 67 Pa. 149 (1871).
55. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1g3i) tit. 68, § 397.
56: The acts are silent on the question.
57. Mogg v. Stone, i Lack. Jur. 232 (Pa. 1889).
58. Ristau v. Crew Levick Co., lO9 Pa. Super. 357, 167 At. 8oo (1933).
59. Wilmington Steamship Co. v. Haas, 151 Pa. 113, 25 Atl. 85 (1892).
6o. Ibid. Castle v. Weber, 2 Pears. 79 (Pa. 1870).
6r. McMullen v. Orr, 8 Phila. 342 (Pa. 1871).
62. It is also available to the landlord. Ansthal v. Patterson, 3 Pennypacker 25
(Pa. 1882).
63. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 68, §397; Grubb v. Fox, 6 Binney 46o
(Pa. 1814) ; Wright v. Clendenning, 6 Phila. 329 (Pa. 1867).
64. That such bond may be of an amount so great as to preclude the tenant from
resort to the remedy, see page 664 infra.
65. See page 655 supra.
66. Lehman v. Lehman, 1g Pa. Dist. 59o (igiO).
67. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1933) tit. 68, §.392.
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to recover possession at the end of the term, the period is ten days.68 In both
instances if the proper bond is posted, the appeal must be heard as a
matter of right, and the appellant is entitled to a trial de novo."
Originally, appeals taken under the act of 1863 did not operate as a
supersedeas in any case,70 but in 1869 the act was amended so that appeals
taken in Philadelphia serve to stay execution of the magistrate's judg-
ment.71 The appellant must give bond for all costs that have accrued, or
may accrue, and all damages that have resulted from the wrongful deten-
tion of the premises.7 2  In order to perfect his appeal under the act of
1830, the tenant must give "good, sufficient, and absolute security, by rec-
ognizance, for all costs that may have and may accrue . . . and also for
all rent that has accrued or may accrue, up to the time of final judgment.
- ." 78 It has been held that an appeal taken under this act will serve
as a supersedeas.7"
RIGHTS OF TENANTS UNDER THE 0. P. A.
The rent control regulations enacted under the Emergency Price Con-
trol Act of 1942 71 constitute the first attempt to regulate rents on a na-
tional scale in this country. However, governmental regulation of rents
is not without precedent elsewhere.78 Four major types of regulatory
legislation have been tried: 7 (I) commission to regulate rents and evic-
tions; 78 (2) admission of the defense of unreasonableness in an action for
rent; 79 (3) the Australian method of a Fair Rent Board; 80 (4) rent-
68. Tripp v. Barnes, I Luz. L. T. (0. S.) 73 (Pa. 1874).
69. Palethorp v. Schmidt, 12 Pa. Super. 214 (1899); Maxwell v. Castiello, 130
Pa. Super. 390, 197 Aft. 536 (1938).
70. That is still the law everywhere but in Philadelphia County. White v. Long,
289 Pa. 525, 137 At. 673 (1927) ; Wertz v. Romberger, 33 Dauph. 75 (Pa. 1929).
71. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 68, § 372.
72. Tripp v. Barnes, I Luz. L. T. (0. S.) 73 (Pa. x874).
73. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 68, §392; Brown v. Schwartz, 146 Pa.
Super. 472, 23 A. (2d) 69 (1942).
74. Rubicum v. Williams, I Asbm. 230 (Pa. 1831).
75. Pub. L. No. 421, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan. 30, 1942).
76. A number of European nations had some form of governmental rent control
during and subsequent to World War I. See European Housing Problems Since the
War, 1914-1923, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, STUDIES AND REPORTS, SERIES G, No.
I (1924). For early state statutory regulation see Borders, Emergency Rent Control
(i942) 9 LAw AND CONTEMP. PROB. 107. See note I supra. Also the Soldiers' and
Sailors' Civil Relief Act of the last war, 40 STAT. 440 (1918), was a step in the direc-
tion of governmental rent control.
77. As classified in Borders, Emergency Rent Control (1942) 9 LAW AND
CONTEMP. PROB. 107.
78. The first attempt at this type of regulation was in the District of Columbia.
Ball Rent Law, 41 STAT. 297 (1919). The commission was empowered to determine
upon complaint or its own initiative whether rents were fair and reasonable. The Act
was held constitutional as a proper exercise of the police power under an existing
emergency. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135 (1921). But later in Peck v. Fink, 2 F.
(2d) 912 (1924), cert. denied 266 U. S. 631 (1925) a 1924 statute continuing the opera-
tion of the statute in question was held unconstitutional on the ground that the emer-
gency had, in fact, passed.
79. Emergency Housing Laws, NEW YORE LAWS 1920, cc. 942, 130-139, as
amended by id. cc. 942-947. In Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel and 8ro West
End Avenue, Inc. v. Stern, 258 U. S. 242 (1922) the constitutionality of Chapter 136
of the New York Laws of 1920 was upheld.
8o. Statutes of New South Wales, 1915, No. 66, set up "Fair Rent" courts to ad-
minister the law. Any lessor or lessee, not in default, could apply to the court to have
the fair rent determined in accordance with a scheme set forth in the Act.
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pegging by reference to a designated normal rent date.81 The plan adopted
in the Emergency Price Control Act is a combination of the above means.
It provides for the pegging of rents by reference, to a fixed date; 82 it sets
up eviction control under the direction of the Administrator 83 with an
appeal to the three-judge Emergency Court of Appeals. s '
One would expect to find the problem of constitutionality arising in
connection with legislation of this sort. Previous legislation has been de-
dared constitutional as an exercise of the emergency power 85 and the
requirement of reasonableness is not too indefinite a standard to satisfy the
due process clause. 8 Not unexpectedly, various attempts have been made
to attack the rent provisions of the present Act as being unconstitutional.8 7
What will perhaps become the leading case on this question was recently
decided by the district court of Kansas."" It is expected that the case will
be taken to the Supreme Court of the United States by certiorari in the
near future.8 9 In that case, Henderson v. Kimmel, an injunction was
sought to restrain a landlord from collecting a rent higher than those
authorized by the regional office and from maintaining any action in the
state court to evict his tenant. The landlord defended on the ground that
the 0. P. A. was unconstitutional, 9 and by counterclaim asked that it be
enjoined from interfering with his pursuance of Kansas remedies. The
relief prayed for in the counterclaim was denied and the Act was declared
constitutional as an exercise of the War Powers of the Constitution.9' It
is emphasized in that opinion that the power to regulate rents is properly
81. This is the procedure followed in England since 1915. The Act of I92o, 1o &
ii GE.o. V, c. 17, is a consolidation of several laws; it is known as the "Principal Act.".
Canadian statutes are of this type also. Order-in-Council, P. C. 4616, Sept. 1i, 1940;
Order-in-Council, P. C. 5003, Sept. 24, 1940; Order No. 33, Wartime Prices and Trade
Board, Feb. 14, i941; Order-in-Council, P. C. 8965, Nov. 21, 1941.
82. Pub. L. No. 421, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan. 3o, 1942), § 2 (b), in which April
i, i94i, was set as the date of reference.
83. Pub. L. No. 421, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan. 30, 1942), § 2 (d).
84. Pub. L. No. 421, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan. 30, 1942), § 204 (c) : "There is
hereby created a court of the United States to be known as the Emergency Court of
Appeals, which shall consist of three or more judges to be designated by the Chief
Justice of the United States from judges of the United States district courts and cir-
cuit courts of appeals. . . . The court shall have the powers of a district court with
respect to the jurisdiction conferred upon it by this Act; except that the court shall
not have power to issue any temporary restraining order or interlocutory decree stay-
ing or restraining, in whole or in part, the effectiveness of any regulation or order
issued under section 2 or any price schedule effective in accordance with the provisions
of section 2o6."
85. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135 (1921).
86. Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co., Inc. v. Siegel and 8io West End Avenue, Inc. v.
Stern, 258 U. S. 242 (1922).
87. The case bearing the most weight is the case decided by the Supreme Court
of Alabama, Kittrell v. Hatter, xo S. (2d) 827 (Ala. 1942). See also Henderson v.
Kimmel, 47 F. Supp. 625 (D. Kan. i942), I Price Control Cases (C. C. H. War Law)
f151,706.
88. Henderson v. Kimmel, 47 F. Supp. 635 (D. Kan. 1942), 1 Price Control Cases
(C. C. H. War Law) 1 51,7o6.
89. Legal Intelligencer, Nov. 17, iW, p. I, col. 4: ". • • since the recent decision
of a three-judge federal court in Kansas, first to consider the rent and price control
program, may be taken direct to the Supreme Court'
go. The charge of unconstitutionality was based upon the contention that the Act
and the administrative regulations made pursuant thereto resulted in depriving the
complainant of his property without due process of law and imposed such a burden
upon his propertk rights as to constitute a taking for public use without just com-
pensation.
91. The war powers are derived from the following parts of the Constitution:
Congress is given in Art. I, § 8, cl. z, power to "provide for the common defense";
id. at ci. 12, 13, "to raise and support armies" and "to provide and maintain a Navy";
id. at cl. 14, "to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and Naval
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implied from the extremely broad war powers 92 and that the 0. P. A. ad-
ministrative framework and procedure is an appropriate means to enforce
that power within the limitations of due process.
Another attempt to attack the constitutionality of the Act was made
in the case of Diffenbaugh v. Cook. The issue there raised first came up
in a lower Indiana court.98 No definite decision was given there, the court
stating it was willing to presume the act constitutional. That court was
of the opinion that it was not an appropriate unit to test legislation of
nation-wide import. The plaintiff then went to the Federal District Court
and sought a declaratory judgment on the validity of the provision of the
Act prescribing exclusive jurisdiction of the Emergency Court of Appeals
to determine the validity of regulations issued pursuant to the Act. That
court upheld the 0. P. A., citing Henderson v. Kirnmel.9 ' Thus it would
appear that the validity of the Act must be tested by the Court which it
created.
Up to this point we have been concerned with the constitutionality of
the Act; we now consider judicial interpretations and decisions arising
under the Regulalions promulgated by authority of the Act. It is provided
that no tenant can be removed from any housing accommodations by any
legal proceeding instituted by his landlord, regardless of the fact that his
lease may have expired or none ever existed, so long as the tenant continues
to pay rent.95 There are certain exceptions: (i) where a tenant, formerly
being in possession under a written lease, has refused to re-execute the
lease on the same terms and conditions for a period of not longer than
one year, provided that the terms are consistent with the Rent Regulations;
(2) where the tenant, occupying under a lease which permits the landlord's
access to the premises for purposes of inspection or re-letting, has refused
his landlord access for such purposes; (3) where the tenant has violated
an obligation, other than that to pay rent, to his landlord and persists in
such violation after the receipt of written notice to desist therefrom; (4)
where the tenant is committing or permitting a nuisance on the premises or
is using or allowing them to be used for an illegal or immoral purpose;
(5) where the landlord in good faith seeks to recover the premises for the
purposes of demolition, reconstruction, or substantial remodeling, which
cannot practicably be done with the tenant in possession; 91 (6) where the
landlord seeks the premises for his own dwelling; (7) where at the time of
Forces"; id. at cl. iI, "to declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make
Rules converning Captures on Land and Water"; id. at cl. io, "to define and punish
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas and Offenses against the Law of
Nations"; id. at cl. s8, "to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for car-
rying into Execution the foregoing powers."
Art. II, § 2, cl. 1, makes the President Commander-in-Chief of the Army and
Navy, and Art. II, § 3, cl. i, empowers him to appoint and commission officers of the
United States.
92. In United States v. Macintosh, 283 U. S. 605, 622 (1930) the Court says,
"From its very nature, the war power, when necessity calls for its exercise, tolerates
no qualifications or limitations, unless found in the Constitution or in applicable prin-
ciples of international law. In the words of John Quincy Adams, 'This power is
tremendous; it is strictly constitutional; but it breaks down every barrier so anxiously
erected for the protection of liberty, property and of life.'"
93. Dieffenbaugh v. Cook, I Price Control Cases (C. C. H. War Law) 51,704
(Ind. Super. Ct. 1942).
94. Dieffenbaugh v. Cook, I Price Control Cases (C. C. H. War Law) 51,712(Ni. D. Ind. 1942).
95. Maximum Rent Regulation No. 60, Dec. i, 1942, § 1388.786, 7 FED. REG.
10,451 (Dec. 15, 1942).
96. Provided that the plans have been approved by proper authorities, according to
the requirements of the local law.
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the expiration of the lease the premises are in the possession of sub-tenants.
In all of the exceptions above listed the landlord can utilize any method
available for dispossession under the local law without interference by the
0. P. A. Division of Rent Control.
9
7
If the landlord wishes to evict for any purpose other than thoge seven
grounds, he may petition the Administrator for permission to do so. 8 The
Administrator has the power to authorize him to pursue any remedy he
might have under local law if it is sufficiently proved that the eviction is
for a purpose not in conflict with the purposes of the Price Control Act.9
However, in all cases, including eviction for non-payment of rent, the land-
lord must give written notice to the tenant and to the Area Rent Office at
least ten days prior to the time specified for the surrender of the premises
and to the institution of any repossessory action. This notice must contain
a statement of the ground relied on for removal of the tenant and specify
the time when the tenant is asked to vacate the demised premises.100 A
second notice must be given when suit is actually instituted; it must con-
tain the title of the case; number, court, etc., and the ground on which re-
moval is sought. This gives the legal staff of the Area Office an oppor-
tunity to intervene and resist any eviction 101 which does not comply with
the Regulations. In this connection it is to be noted that a landlord must
give io days notice even where he exercises a power in the lease to con-
fess judgment.
There has been a paucity of judicial decisions on the interpretation of
the foregoing provisions. However, the few decisions which have been
handed down, coupled with various official Rent Control Interpretations,
will serve as some indication of the liberality with which evictions will be
permitted. Apparently one of the most common grounds advanced by the
landlord to justify the dispossession of his tenant is that the tenant is per-
mitting a nuisance to exist on the premises. In a recent case in the Phila-
delphia area 10 2 where premises twenty feet square were occupied by six
persons, a cat, and a dog, the landlord was sustained in his contention. In
97. Maximum Rent Regulation No. 28, June 30, 1942, § I388.i8o6, 7 FED. REa.
4915 (July 1, 1942), as amended on Oct. 20, 1942, §6, 7 FED. REG. 8505 (Oct. 21,
1942). See Mulder, "Explanation of Eviction Provisions of Amended Maximum Rent
Regulation," Legal Intelligencer, Oct. 29, 1942, p. 639, col. 3.
g8. Maximum Rent Regulation No. 28, June 30, 1942, § 1388.i8o6, 7 FED. REG.
4915 (July I, i942), as amended Oct. 20, 1942, § 6. subsec. b (), 7 FED. REa. 85o5
(Oct. 21, 1942) : "No tenant shall be removed or evicted on grounds other than those
stated above unless, on petition of the landlord, the Administrator certifies that the
landlord may pursue his remedies in accordance with the requirements of the local
law."
99. Those purposes as set forth in the Emergency Price Control Act, 56 STAT. 23,
5o U. S. C. A. § goi (Supp. 1943) : "It is hereby declared to be in the interest of the
national defense and security and necessary to the effective prosecution of the present
war, and the purposes of this Act are, to stabilize prices and to prevent speculative, un-
warranted, and abnormal increases in prices and rents; to eliminate and prevent profi-
teering, hoarding, manipulation, speculation, and other disruptive practices resulting
from abnormal market conditions. .. ."
ioo. 0 P.A. Rent Control Form No. IO4.
ro. Such intervention is usually made by entering an appearance as amicus curiae.
Ricciardi v. Henley, i Price Control Cases (C. C. H. War Law) 51,702 (Waterbury,
Conn., Mun. Ct. i942) ; Vecchio v. One Kelly, i Price Control Cases (C. C. H. War
Law) 51,705 (Mich. C. C. 1942). Or the division office may seek an injunction
against the landlord's action. Henderson v. Kimmel, 45 F. Supp. 635 (D. Kan. z942),
i Price Control Cases (C. C. H. War Law) 51,7o6; Flora v. Wilder, i Price Con-
trol Cases (C. C. H. War Law) 1 51,710 (Kan. Dist. Ct. i942).
io2. Henderson v. Gandy, i Price Control Cases (C. C. H. War Law) 1 51,7o8
(E. D. Pa. 1942).
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the language of the court, "to give legal sanction to whatever the arrange-
ment was, would be to defy the very spirit and purpose of the legisla-
tion." 108 In that instance the tenant was ordered to vacate the premises
within two weeks, thereby abating the nuisance. On the other hand, the
mere fact that the tenant has children is not a nuisance and therefore not
sufficient grounds to permit eviction by the landlord.104 Nor did the land-
lord succeed where the activity complained of was a "pounding upstairs"
and "causing fire-pot in the furnace to become broken by putting water
in it." 105
Under the Regulations prior to the issuance of Maximum Rent Regu-
lation No. 57 on November 27, 1942,101 a ground frequently resorted to
by landlords was that the demised premises were ndeded as a residence
for his own family or dependents. An official rent control interpretation
defined family to mean "father, mother, brother, sister, spouse, or descend-
ant"; 107 all relatives of the landlord are not included. Dependents are
limited to those in fact dependent upon the landlord for support.""" A
recent decision under the District of Columbia Emergency Rent Act Ill
offers some indication of how courts will interpret this provision. It was
there held that the claim for personal use must be made in good faith and
that landlords must do more than prove an intent to move into the premises.
In that case the landlord and his son-in-law, who was to take the lease and
share the premises, already had comfortable, adequate quarters. It was
there held that the eviction was not justified as being for a personal use.
However, the provision permitting resumption of possession where the
premises are to be used by the landlord's dependents has been superseded
by Maximum Rent Regulation No. 57 which warrants repossession by the
landlord only where the premises are to be used by himself. In any other
situation he must petition the Administrator for permission to remove the
tenant.110
Apparently there has been no judicial construction of the exception
authorizing eviction where the landlord desires to make a substantial alter-
ation in the premises."' However, a Rent Control Interpretation of Ap-
gust 15, 1942 112 answers four hypothetical cases: (i) desire to change two
six-room apartments into three four-room apartments will warrant evic-
tion; (2) desire to change two apartments into a single dwelling will not
justify eviction; (3) desire to furnish an apartment, previous unfurnished,
will justify eviction; (4) desire to change a furnished apartment into an
unfurnished apartment will not justify dispossession. The related question
of refusing the landlord access to the premises is discussed in an interpre-
103. Ibid.
104. Ricciardi v. Henley, i Price Control Cases (C. C. H. War Law) 1 51,702
(Waterbury, Conn., Mun. Ct. 194).
io5. Kinkopf v. Martoni, i Price Control Cases (C. C. H. War Law) 51,703
(Ohio C. P. 1942).
io6. 7 FED. REG. 9958 (Dec. 1, 1942).
107. Rent Control Interpretation No. 7, July 31, 1942 (C. C. H. War Law)
149,258 (D. C. Mun. Ct. 1942).
io8. Ibid.
iog. Hagmuller v. Reid, i Price Control Cases (C. C. H. War Law) 1 51,709 (D.
C. Mun. Ct. 1942).
"io. Maximum Rent Regulation No. 57, § 1388.586, Nov. 7, 1942, 7 FED. REG.
9963 (Dec. 15, 1942).
in. Maximum Rent Regulation No. 6o, § 1388.786 (a) (5), Dec. i, 1942, 7 FFD.
REG. 10,452 (Dec. 15, 1942). The controlling questions are the good faith of the land-
lord and the necessity for an eviction to make the repairs possible.
112. Rent Control Interpretation No. 25, Aug. i5, i942 (C. C. H. War Law)
949,276.
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tation handed down in September 1942.118 Other official interpretations
have been released on the questions of changes in ownership of the prop-
erty by sale,114 execution of mortgages, leases in violation of restrictive
covenants, trespassers, etc.
It is interesting to note that although the landlord may not evict a
tenant who refuses to execute a new lease for a rent which is higher than
that which the tenant had been paying, the landlord may write into the new
lease, to which the tenant voluntarily accedes, a provision calling for an
automatic increase of the rent in the event that the 0. P. A. is discontinued
or the rent-ceiling is raised. An interpretation has been issued indicating
various acceptable forms in which conditions of this type may be drafted." 5
In view of the fact that rent control is expected to last for the duration of
the present emergency only, it is to be anticipated that this provision will
appear rather frequently in leases.
AUTHORITY TO INTERVENE IN STATE EVICTION PROCEEDINGS
As has been pointed out above, the power to freeze rents has been
upheld under the War Power. 11 Some question may still remain as to
whether the authority of the Administrator to intervene in state procedings
for eviction will be recognized. In most instances it will probably be upheld
as a necessary incident to rent control itself, for, as one court has pointed
out, "If landlords were allowed to proceed to remove tenants without any
restriction, such practice might very well result in manipulation of rents,
possible collusion and probable increase of rents". 7  Concerning this
problem there is authority for the proposition that the rent office may
restrain eviction actions commenced, but still pending, at the time of the
effective date of the Act." 8 However, the usual procedure is for the rent
authority to file a brief as amicus curiae by leave of court. When that line
of action is followed it is an interesting speculation whether the court has
any discretion to refuse to allow the Administration to become a party to
the action. To the writers' knowledge this issue has not yet been raised.
As has already been indicated the three-judge Emergency Court of
Appeals established by the Act has exclusive jurisdiction to stay, restrain,
enjoin, set aside, or pass upon the constitutionality of the Act or any
regulation promulgated thereunder. And, therefore, the regulations regard-
ing interference in state proceedings would seem to be no exception to the
general rule. In view of the fact that State and Federal District Courts
to which appeals have been made have declared themselves bound by these
provisions,119 it is to be presumed that it will be the Emergency Court of
113. Rent Control Interpretation No. 40, Sept. 4, 1942 (C. C. H. War Law)
49,291.
1'4. Rent Control Interpretation No. 39, Sept. 4, 1942 (C. C. H. War Law)
f149,290.
11S. Rent Control Interpretation No. 49, Sept. 26, I942 (C. C. H. War Law)
49,300.
i6. See note 88 supra.
117. Ricciardi v. Henley, I Price Control Cases (C. C. H. War Law) 15i,7o2
(Waterbury, Conn., Mun Ct. 1942).
1x8. Flora v. Wilder, I Price Control Cases (C. C. H. War Law) ff 5x,710 (Kan.
Dist. Ct. 1942) ; Rent Control Interpretation No. 2, July 31, 1942 (C. C. H. War Law)
49,253.
ng. Kittrell v. Hatter, io S. (2d) 827 (Ala. I942) ; Henderson v. Kinimel, 45 F.
Supp. 625 (D. Kan. i942), 1 Price Control Cases (C. C. H. War Law) 1 51,7o6; Dief-
fenbaugh v. Cook, i Price Control Cases (C. C. H. War Law) 51,712 (N. D. Ind.
z942) ; Scopline et ux. v. Heyer, I Price Control Cases (C. C. H. War Law) 1 51,713
(Wis. C. C. 1942).
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Appeals which will answer all problems concerning intervention in the state
proceedings.
Adequate methods of enforcement being so imperative to the success
of a program of this sort,'1 20 it is to be expected that the Act should contain
some such provisions. Accordingly, Section 205 of the Act has set forth
three sanctions to be employed for enforcement purposes. The first of
these, found in subsection (a) provides: "Whenever in the judgment of the
Administrator any person has engaged or is about to engage in any acts or
practices which constitute or will constitute a violation of any provision of
section 4 of this Act, he may make application to the appropriate court for
an order enjoining such acts or practices, or for an order enforcing com-
pliance with such provision, and upon a showing by the Administrator that
such person has engaged or is about to engage in any such acts or practices
a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order
shall be granted without bond." By virtue of that provision, a landlord was
recently enjoined from violating the maximum rent regulation by a Penn-
sylvania district court despite the fact that he had discontinued the practices
complained of.' 2 ' By virtue of the second sanction appearing in subsection
(b), any person who wilfully violates any provision of the Act or makes a
false statement in any document required of him under the Act is subject
to criminal prosecution and a maximum fine of $5ooo. There are indications
that that provision will be enforced against uncooperative landlords.
1 2
The final sanction, provided for in subsection (e), permits a tenant who
has paid excessive rent to bring an action either for $50 or three times the




From the foregoing analysis the difficulties in 0. P. A. rent control in
Pennsylvania become apparent. It is not surprising that a rent control
program, a vital part of an integrated plan to prevent prices from rising too
rapidly, would be hampered by age-old procedures evolved for the purpose
of giving the landlord quick and effective evictions. Two features of the
Pennsylvania law have proved to be an unusual handicap: first, the difficulty
of obtaining an effective review of the summary proceedings before magis-
trates; and second, the procedure by which a landlord may enter judgment
in an amicable action of ejectment.
As has been indicated above, to obtain a review of most summary pro-
ceedings before magistrates, the tenant must post a bond covering rentals
due and to accrue, as well as costs in the action. This works a hardship
on the tenant. In many cases the fact that the tenant is seeking a review
of the judgment obtained against him will not alone prevent his being
ejected. The writ of certiorari does not always operate as a supersedeas.
The only weapon of the Area Rent Administrator to combat the harshness
of this prerequisite to review is by eliminating any necessity therefor. This
120. See note i supra.
121. Henderson v. Baldwin, i Price Control Cases (C. C. H. War Law) 51,711
(W. D. Pa. 1942). See also Henderson v. Detweiler et ux., i Price Control Cases
(C. C. H. War Law) 1 51,715 (D. Neb. 1942).
122. Legal Intelligencer, Dec. 14, 1942, p. 891, col. 6.
123. This action can be brought in any court of competent jurisdiction. Whatley
v. Love, i Price Control Cases (C. C. H. War Law) 1 51,716 (New Orleans City Ct.
1942). See also Berndt v. Shaw, i Price Control Cases (C. C. H. War Law) 51,707
(People's Ct. of Baltimore 1942).
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result might be accomplished by intervening in the magistrate's courts, by
enjoining the institution of proceedings, or by enjoining the execution of
any judgment obtained therein.
The current regulations of the 0. P. A. expressly outlaw judgments
by confession unless entered with the approval of the Area Rent Office. In
many states this provision would create no controversy because such judg-
ments have long been refused recognition. It is to be presumed that the
sharp conflict between the Pennsylvania practice and the 0. P. A. regulation
will ultimately be resolved in favor of the federal agency.
The Pennsylvania remedies arose at a time when the national interest
did not sharply conflict with the interests of property-owners. The pro-
visions of our national rent control program are not designed to favor
tenants as a class over landlords, but rather to provide adequate housing in
defense areas and to promote general economic stability by preventing
inflationary rental charges. Thus, it does not necessarily mean that there
has been a congressional determination that the Pennsylvania remedies are
not appropriate for more normal times. Nevertheless, the experiences
under the current rent control program may serve as a guide for future
modifications in Pennsylvania eviction procedure.
M. E. H.*
E. W. V.
* Written by Mary Elizabeth Hatton and Ellis William Van Horn, while editors
of the UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW RmEv, before their graduation in Feb-
ruary, 1943.
